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Abstract 
The present research compared members of dignity and honor cultures and aims to 
demonstrate how the presence of a social reward influences their level of trust, 
negotiation offers and use of negotiation strategy in a negotiation. By using a negotiation 
scenario we found that members of honor cultures trusted less, had higher negotiation 
offers (i.e. target goals, first prices and limit of the offers) and used both more the S&O 
as the Q&A strategy. In contrast to the predictions, the presence of a social reward did 
not influence the level of trust, target goals and first prices of the offers for members of 
honor cultures. The presence of a social reward did influence the limit of offers for both 
cultures, which was mediated by positive reciprocity. Furthermore, the presence of a 
social reward did not influence the use of negotiation strategy. The findings will be 
discussed in light of previous and future research.  
 
 'More than ever, faced with the challenges of living together in a nuclear age on a 
increasingly crowed planet, for our own sake and the sake of our future generations, we 
need to learn how to change the basic game of conflict. We need to go to getting to 'Yes' 
(Fisher, Ury & Patton, 2012).  The above quotation reflects the importance of cooperation 
in negotiations. Negotiations are a common process in daily life, within families, in 
politics, in business and so on. It often occurs that negotiations take place between people 
of different cultural backgrounds. For example, negotiations between US and Syria about 
the political situation in Syria or negotiations of the UN about a covenant. Because 
different cultures have different ways of making decisions, intercultural negotiations are 
an interest for psychological research. A lot of research focuses extensively on 
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differences between dignity and face cultures, however the present research compared 
dignity cultures with honor cultures.  
  The present research focuses on the influence of the ideals of dignity and honor 
cultures and social rewards on trust and cooperation in negotiations. Specially, the 
present research investigates how the presence of a social reward influences the 
negotiation offers and negotiation strategies of members of dignity and honor cultures, 
and the role of trust by this relationship. 
Dignity and honor cultures 
 The present research focuses on the differences between dignity and honor 
cultures, which have been a main focus in research by others as well. To begin with 
dignity cultures, which can be found in Western European countries and in the North of 
the US (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Cross et al., 2014). Dignity can be defined as the intrinsic 
value of a person, which is possessed from birth and equal to the dignity of others (Leung 
& Cohen, 2011; Severance et al., 2013). It is supposed that person's dignity can never be 
lost (Severance et al., 2013). People have an inherent human worth (Leung & Cohen, 
2011; Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Alözkan, & Ataca, 2012). The self-worth of members 
of dignity cultures is stable and equal to others (Ayers, 1984), which is devoting to the 
independent self construal of members of dignity cultures: people's self-image is not 
related to the behavior of others (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Severance et al., 2013). Thus, 
internal evaluations of the self are more important than external evaluations of the self for 
members of dignity cultures (Severance et al., 2013). Self-worth is intrinsically derived, 
and therefore it can neither increase by others esteem or decrease by others disrespect 
(Leung & Cohen, 2011; Cross et al., 2012). Social rejection or social exclusion are not 
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very damaging for the self-worth of members of dignity cultures and they also do not 
have to prove themselves to others (Severance et al., 2013). In theory, insults and 
aggressive behaviors towards people's dignity do not harm one's dignity (Severance et al., 
2013).  
 On the other hand there are honor cultures, which can be found in the Middle 
East, North African, Mediterranean (Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-Swing & Ataca, 
2012) and Latin American areas (Cross et al., 2014), and in the South of the US (Cohen, 
Nisbett, Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996). Honor is defined as the value of a person in his own 
eyes, but also in the eyes of others and the society (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Cross et al., 
2012; Severance et al., 2013). Honor is not possessed from birth, but has to be earned and 
can also be lost (Severance et al., 2013). Honor has a collectivistic nature based on social 
image or reputation, which refers to how people see others and how much people value 
others (Rodriguez, Mosquera, Fisher, Manstead & Zaalberg, 2008). Both reputation of 
the self and family are important (Severance et al., 2013), and therefore evaluations of the 
self are both internally and externally derived. Members of honor cultures have an 
interdependent self-construal, so their self-image is related to the behavior of others and 
the group to which they belong is important for them (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Severance 
et al., 2013). Social image strongly affects self-image, what makes protection of social 
image in social relations a concern (Rodriguez et al., 2008). Social exclusion is very 
damaging for people's self-worth (Severance et al., 2013), and for that reason members of 
honor cultures try to maintain strong family ties, social harmony and interdependence 
(Rodriguez et al., 2008). Honor cultures are characterized by warmth, hospitality and 
politeness, but also by aggression (Cross et al., 2012). When honor is harmed, members 
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of honor cultures react by punishing the offender to discourage the other from further 
violation (Cross et al., 2012; Severance et al., 2013). 
 A lot of research has focused on the negative side of honor, when it is harmed. 
For example, Van Osh, Breugelmans, Zeelenberg and Bölük (2013) found that members 
of honor culture react more aggressively after insult than members of dignity cultures, 
due to a higher concern for family honor. Cohen et al. (1996) found also that members of 
honor cultures were more aggressive, but also more upset and angry after insult. They felt 
more threat to their masculine reputation and were more physically aroused for future 
aggressive behavior (Cohen et al., 1996). Moreover, research by Beermsa, Harinck and 
Gerts (2003) found that after an insult from a co-worker, individuals with high honor 
values reacted more in a competitive way to the workplace conflict than individuals with 
low honor values. This was partially explained by the fact that they also perceived more 
conflict and experienced more negative emotions (Beersma et al., 2003).  
Cooperation and social rewards 
 But what can be done to diminish conflict after being offended or how can 
cooperation be instigated between members of dignity and honor cultures? Cooperation is 
often a result of reciprocity, which motivates people to react in accordance with others to 
have balanced relationships. Reciprocity means that people respond more nicely and 
cooperative to friendly behavior and respond more badly and not cooperative to hostile 
actions (Engelen, 2008). In case of negative reciprocity, a person tends to punish 
offenders with antisocial behavior, even when it is not beneficial for that person. In case 
of positive reciprocity, a person tends to answer a gift with a gift, even when it is not 
needed to receive a gift back (Engelen, 2008). People with strong reciprocity norms want 
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to repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms more, even in an 
one-shot interaction with unrelated strangers (Engelen, 2008).  
 Members of honor cultures have strong reciprocity norms. They want to pay back 
the good as well the bad, so they respond with negative reciprocity to insults and with 
positive reciprocity to favors (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Leung and Cohen examined in 
their first experiment how positive reciprocity was related to the approval of honor- 
related violence and to the belief in an individual worth, namely inherent worth in dignity 
cultures versus socially conferred worth in honor cultures. Positive reciprocity was 
measured with how much participants try to help one of the confederates by finding back 
a disk. The confederate gave a candy to the participants in the positive reciprocity 
condition or gave no candy to the participants in the non reciprocity condition. Results 
showed that in the positive reciprocity condition honor-culture participants who most 
endorsed payback in form of honor-related violence tried to help the confederate more 
than honor-culture participants who rejected honor-related violence. In contrast, after 
receiving a gift dignity-culture participants who rejected honor related violence tried to 
help the confederate more than dignity-culture participants who endorsed payback in 
form of honor-related violence (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Furthermore, a higher belief in 
an inherent worth resulted in more effort to repay a gift. So, members of dignity cultures 
wanted to pay back a gift because of one's integrity, whereas members of honor cultures 
wanted to payback a gift because of high reciprocity norms (Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
Cooperation is often the result of reciprocity (Engelen, 2008), and likewise 
members of dignity and honor cultures were more willing to cooperate after receiving a 
gift (Leung & Cohen, 2011). The gift can be seen as a way to give the receiver a social 
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reward. Social rewards are the use of typically expressed verbal cues, for example 
recognition, attention, praise, compliments and respect (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003). The 
gift will be given in exchange for future benefit, however receiving future benefit is 
dependent on how the receiver will reacts on the gift. Will the receiver continue with 
dominant behavior to maximum own benefit or reciprocate for joint benefit? Which 
strategy the receiver chooses, depends on if the receiver trusts the intentions of the other 
person (McCabe, Rigdon & Smith, 2002). The present research aims to demonstrate that 
a social reward in form of a gift signals cooperation and that the receiver of the gift will 
trust the intentions of the other person and will reciprocate with cooperation as well. As 
shown in several research, rewards have a strong positive effect on building trust. For 
example, research by Servátka, Tucker and Vadivic (2011) showed that giving a gift 
increased trust. In their research participants increased their amount of money in the 
investment game after receiving a gift as a result of increased trust (Servátka et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, research by Tjosvold (1985) found that by using a joint decision making 
task, cooperative rewards leads to more interpersonal trust than competitive rewards 
(Tjosvold, 1985). Cooperative rewards are based on joint performance and stimulate 
cooperate behavior (e.g. information sharing), whereas competitive rewards are based on 
the performance of an individual and stimulate adverse behavior (e.g. withholding of 
information) (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003).  
Trust,  honor and dignity cultures 
 Cooperation is important for trust, because cooperation signals that a person is 
trustworthy (Engelen, 2008). Trust is defined as the willingness to have confidence in a 
partner (Ribbink & Grimm, 2014) and trust is strongly influenced by culture (Gunia, 
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Brett, Nandkeolyar & Kamdar, 2011). Members of honor cultures have a lower level of 
trust than members of dignity cultures, which can be explained in terms of tightness. For 
example, the present research compared the honor culture of Spain with the dignity 
culture of the Netherlands. The honor culture of Spain is characterized with more 
tightness compared to the dignity culture of the Netherlands (Gelfand, 2011). Cultures 
with a 'tight' character (e.g. Spain) have strong and clearly defined social norms (Gelfand, 
Nishii & Raver, 2006). Members of 'tight' cultures rely more on institutional trust. 
Institutions control their situations and provide assurance, so there is no need for 
interpersonal trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Instead, trust is more dependent of 
the situation and benevolence: when the trustee signals reciprocity, loyalty and 
cooperation (Branzei, Veryinsky & Camp, 2007). In contrast, cultures with a 'loose' 
character (e.g. Netherlands) have relatively flexible and informal social norms (Gelfand 
et al., 2006). Members of 'loose' cultures rely more on interpersonal trust due to smooth 
social interactions (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). This could explain why members of 
dignity cultures tend to make the 'swift trust' assumption: they trust others until is proven 
otherwise (Weber, Malhotra & Murninghan, 2005).  
 Furthermore, culture influences trust and trust is an important element in 
negotiations (Gunia et al., 2011; Ribbink & Grimm, 2014). Members of 'tight' cultures 
have a lower level of trust in negotiations than members of members of 'loose' cultures. 
This is demonstrated in research by Gunia et al. (2011), which stated that American 
participants of a 'loose' culture have high interpersonal trust, whereas Indian participants 
of a 'tight' have low interpersonal trust. Indian participants relies more on institutional 
trust, however there is less basis for institutional trust in negotiations. Results showed 
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that American participants indeed trusted more the counterpart in negotiations than 
Indian participants (Gunia et al., 2011). The independent self in dignity cultures is related 
to self-confidence and pragmatism, what makes members of dignity cultures more 
comfortable to trust their counterpart in negotiations (Brett, 2007). Members of dignity 
cultures are also less concerned about losing social status as a result of breach of trust 
than members of honor cultures (Aslani et al., 2011). Members of honor cultures have a 
high concern for losing social status due to breach of trust, and therefore are less 
comfortable trusting the counterpart and do not want to show weakness in negotiations 
(Aslani et al., 2011).  
Negotiation offers and negotiation strategy 
 Trust is important in negotiations (Gunia et al., 2011; Ribbink & Grimm, 2014), 
because trust influences the level of information sharing. When negotiators trust their 
counterpart, they assume that the counterpart will share information with them in a 
beneficial way and not to take advantage of them (Gunia et al., 2011). Likewise, 
counterparts are seen as more trustworthy when they share more information, which also 
leads to more reciprocity of information sharing (Butler, 1995). Members of dignity 
cultures trust more and therefore they gather and share more information to gain insights 
(Brett, 2007). This was demonstrated in research by Aslani et al. (2011), which used a 
negotiation task to examine how cultural values of dignity and honor effect negotiation 
processes. Results showed that members of dignity cultures shared and actually 
exchanged more information than members of honor cultures, which resulted in more 
insight of preferences and priorities of their counterparts. Higher insight resulted in 
higher agreements on the six issues for members of dignity cultures. In contrast, members 
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of honor culture exchanged information less openly, resulting in lower insight and lower 
agreements on the six issues (Aslani et al., 2011). This could be explained by the more 
expressed negative emotions and aggressive motives as result of the competitive 
dynamics of a negotiation among members of honor cultures (Aslani et al., 2011). 
Negotiators with competitive motives are commonly to make the first offer and make the 
first offer as extreme as possible, while still being reasonable (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). 
Making a high first offer is beneficial for negotiators with competitive motives, because it 
is an anchor for the counteroffer. So the higher the first offer, the higher the counteroffer 
and agreement price (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Members of honor cultures aspire 
to have higher agreements in negotiations than members of dignity cultures (Aslani et al., 
2011). Negotiators with high aspirations try to persuade for own benefit (Kimmel, Pruitt 
Magenau, Konar-Goldband & Carnevale, 1980), for example by trying to limit 
counterpart's offers (Maaravi, Ganzach & Pazy, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the level of trust and information sharing in a negotiation affects the 
choice of negotiation strategy (Ribbink & Grimm, 2014). Negotiation strategies are used 
to achieve an agreement (Gunia et al., 2011). An example of a negotiation strategy is the 
Question and Answer strategy. The Q&A strategy relies on asking questions and 
providing answer early in the negotiation, because questions leads to more information 
sharing and answers leads to knowledge about priorities, preferences and interests (Gunia 
et al., 2011). The shared information and knowledge will be integrated in offers. The 
Q&A strategy is based on trust, because it is uncertain if the counterpart will use 
information from questions and answers to take advantage (Butler, 1999). Members of 
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dignity cultures are comfortable to trust the other party, and therefore uses the Q&A 
strategy more often (Gunia et al., 2011).  
 Another negotiation strategy is Substantiation and Offers, which is more use by 
members of honor cultures (Gunia et al., 2011). The  S&O strategy relies on justifying 
own demands and challenging counterparts' logic, assumptions or facts. Substantiation 
tactics are for instance power plays, threats and appeals to fairness and the aim is to be 
more advantaged in the offers (Gunia et al., 2011). The S&O strategy is not based on 
trust, because of less uncertainty of the use of the information (Gunia et al., 2011).  
Therefore, negotiators with a low level of trust and high aspirations are likely to use 
strategies to persuade the other to improve his proposal for own benefit. (Kimmel et al., 
1980). The S&O strategy can be the result of competitive motives of the negotiators or as 
a defense to the motives of the counterpart (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). Members of 
honor cultures had more aggressive motives as a result of the competitive dynamics of a 
negotiation, and therefore aspire to have higher agreements in negotiations than members 
of dignity cultures (Aslani et al., 2011).  
Present research 
 Studies have investigated differences between dignity and honor cultures (e.g. 
Rodriguez et al., 2008; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Cross et al., 2012; Severance et al., 2013).  
Especially, a lot of research has compared dignity and honor culture by focusing on the 
negative side of honor, in case honor is harmed (e.g. Cohen et al., 1996; Beersma et al., 
2003; Van Osh et al., 2013). However, not much is known about how to instigate trust 
and cooperation among members of honor cultures. The present research focuses on the 
influence of the ideals of dignity and honor cultures and social rewards on trust and 
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cooperation in negotiations. Specially, we investigate how the presence of a social reward 
influences trust, the negotiation offers and negotiation strategies of members of dignity  
cultures and members of honor cultures.  
 Based on findings of previous research regarding trust and cultures (e.g. Gelfland 
et al., 2006; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), we assume that members of a dignity 
culture generally trust more than members of honor cultures. Furthermore, research has 
shown that rewards has a strong effect on building trust (Tjosvold, 1985; Ferrin & Dirks, 
2003; Servátka et al., 2011), and we assume that the presence of a social reward will lead 
to trust in a negotiation as well. However, because of the low level of general trust in 
combination with strong reciprocity norms, we assume that the level of trust of members 
of honor cultures in a negotiation will be more vulnerable for the presence of a social 
reward. In contrast, because members of dignity cultures are likely to generally trust 
another person, we assume that the level of trust of members of dignity cultures in a 
negotiation will be not dependent on the presence of a social reward. Therefore, we have 
the following three assumptions regarding trust: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Dutch participants will score higher on general trust than Spanish 
participants.  
Hypothesis 2a: The participants in the social reward condition will score higher on 
situational trust than participants in the no social reward condition. 
Hypothesis 2b: Spanish participants will score higher on situational trust in the social 
reward condition than Spanish participants in the no social reward condition, whereas 
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Dutch participants will score high on situational trust regardless of the presence of a 
social reward. 
 
Furthermore, because of the low level of trust and high concern that trust will be 
betrayed in combination with competitive motives in negotiations (Aslani et al., 2011), 
we assume that members of honor cultures will have higher negotiation offers than 
members of dignity cultures. Furthermore, we assume that the target goals, first prices 
and limit of offers are not based on trust, but a result of the motives and aspirations of the 
negotiator (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Therefore, we 
expect that the presence of a social reward will not influence negotiation offers. 
However, because members of honor cultures have strong reciprocity norms (Leung & 
Cohen, 2011), we expect the presence of a social reward will lower the negotiation offers 
of members of honor cultures. The presence of a social reward will not influence the 
negotiation offers of members of dignity cultures. Therefore, we have the following three 
assumptions regarding negotiation offers: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Spanish participants will have a higher target goals,  higher first prices 
and a higher limit of offers than Dutch participants.  
Hypothesis 3b: There will be no main effect of social reward on  negotiation offers.  
Hypothesis 3c: Spanish participants will have lower negotiation offers in the social 
reward condition than Spanish participants in the no social reward condition, whereas the 
presence of a social reward will not influence the negotiation offers of Dutch participants.  
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Furthermore, the Q&A strategy is based on trust and members of dignity are 
likely to trust another person in a negotiation (Gunia et al., 2011), so we assume that 
members of dignity cultures use more the Q&A strategy than members of honor cultures. 
Furthermore, we assume that a social reward will lead to trust in a negotiation and 
therefore will increases the use of the Q&A strategy, which is based on trust. However, 
because of the low level of general trust of members of honor cultures, we predicted that 
the presence of a social reward will make in particular members of honor more 
vulnerable for the use of the Q&A strategy. Because of the high level of general trust, 
members of dignity cultures are likely to use the Q&A strategy and will use the Q&A 
strategy regardless of the presence of a social reward. Therefore, we have the following 
three assumption regarding the use of Q&A strategy:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Dutch participants will use more Q&A strategy than Spanish participants. 
Hypothesis 4b: The participants in the social reward condition will use more the Q&A 
strategy than participants in the no social reward condition.  
Hypothesis 4c: Spanish participants will use the Q&A strategy more in the social reward 
condition than Spanish participants in the no social reward condition, whereas Dutch 
participants will use the Q&A strategy regardless of a presence of a social reward. 
 
Finally, the S&O is not based on trust and could be the result of competitive 
motives of the negotiators (Gunia et al., 2011). Because of the low level of trust and 
competitive motives of members of honor cultures in negotiations, we assume that 
members of honor cultures will use more the S&O strategy than members of dignity 
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cultures. Because the S&O strategy relies not on trust, we do not expected that the 
presence of a social reward will influence the use of the S&O strategy. In line with this 
hypothesis, we do not expect that the presence of a social reward in combination with 
belonging the one of the two cultures will influence the use of S&O strategy. Therefore, 
we have the following three assumption regarding the use of S&O strategy:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Spanish participants will use more S&O strategy than Dutch participants.  
Hypothesis 5b: There will no main effect of social reward on use of the S&O strategy.  
Hypothesis 5c: There will no interaction effect of social reward and culture on use of the 
S&O strategy 
 
To test our hypotheses we conducted an experiment in which participants have to 
read a scenario. First, individual characteristics and cultural values of dignity and honor 
were measured. Subsequently, participants read a scenario about a negotiation with their 
imaginary neighbor about a video projector. Participants receive a gift from their 
neighbor in the condition with the social reward, while participants receive no gift from 
their neighbor in the condition without the social reward. Finally, trust, negotiation 
strategies and negotiation offers were measured.  
Method 
Participants and design  
 In the present research 210 participants participated. Four participants were 
removed, because one participant did not complete the test and three participants strongly 
deviated (more than 5 standard deviations) in terms of age. In the final analysis, 
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participants were 114 undergraduates of the University of Leiden (93 women, 81.6%) and 
92 undergraduates of the University of Seville (77 women, 83.7%). Gender was equally 
distributed in the two cultures (χ2 < 1, ns). Spanish participants were between 18 and 32 
years old (Mage = 20.26
1
, SDage = 2.56), and Dutch participants were between 17 and 28 
years old (Mage = 19.95, SDage = 2.21). The two cultures did not significantly differ in age 
(F < 1, ns). Honor-culture participants all had the Spanish nationality and the majority of 
the dignity-culture participants had a Dutch nationality, one participant had a German 
nationality, one participant had a English nationality and one participant had a Indonesian 
nationality. Because Germany and England are dignity cultures as well and discarding the 
one with the Indonesian nationality did not influence the results, these participants were 
all included in the analysis. Participants were all rewarded with 1 course credit or 3,50 
euro.  
 The experiment had a 2×2 quasi -experimental between-participants design. 
Participants were assigned to one of the two conditions of the independent variable 
culture, namely Spanish participants to honor culture and Dutch participants to dignity 
culture. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions of the 
independent variable social reward (gift vs. no gift). Dependent variables were trust, 
negotiation strategy and negotiation offers.  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited at the University of Leiden and the University of 
Seville. Participants were informed that the study assessed cultural differences in a 
negotiation and took about 25 minutes. Upon arrival, each participant signed the 
                                                 
1
 7 participants did not fill in their age. Therefore, the average mean of age of the honor culture group were 
filled in the missing values for the analysis.  
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informed consent and was led to a separate cubicle containing a computer, which was 
used to present the instructions, surveys and the scenario in order to collect data. First, 
participants filled in surveys about values of dignity and honor cultures, general trust and 
self-esteem. Subsequently, participants read a scenario about a negotiation and were 
asked to imagine that they negotiate with their neighbor about selling their video 
projector. Participants who were assigned to the social reward condition received a gift 
from their neighbor, while participants who were assigned to the no social reward 
condition received no gift from their neighbor. Then, negotiation strategies and 
negotiation offers were measured by asking questions about offer price and use of 
strategy, and trust during the negotiation was measured with a survey. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and rewarded with 1 course credit or 3,50 euro.  
Materials   
 Dignity values. Dignity values were assessed with seven statements (Severance et 
al., 2013). For example, 'How much a person respects himself is far more important than 
how much others respect him'. Responses were measured on a 7-point rating scale (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much), where higher scores indicated more endorsement of dignity 
values (α = .73).  
 Honor values.  Honor values (family) were assessed with five statements 
(Rodriguez, Manstead & Fisher, 2002), which included items focused on concern for 
family honor. For example, 'How bad would people in your culture feel about themselves 
if their family had a bad reputation?' (α = .86). Honor values (personal and family) were 
assessed with five statements (Rodriquez et al., 2008), which included items focused on 
the importance of positive evaluation or respect by others and family social image. For 
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example, 'It is important that others see me as someone who deserves respect' (α = .73). 
Responses were measured on 7-point rating scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), where 
higher scores indicated more endorsement of honor values.  
 General trust. General trust were assessed with five statements (Gunia et al., 
2011). For example, 'In negotiations the other party will try to be someone who keeps 
promises and commitments'. Responses were measured on a 7-point rating scale (1 = 
totally disagree, 7 = totally agree), where higher score indicated more trust (α = .80). 
 Self-esteem. The general feeling about oneself were assessed with ten statements 
(Rosenberg, 1979). For example, 'On the whole, I am satisfied with myself'. Responses 
were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree), where higher 
scores indicated more self-esteem (α = .72).  
Scenario 
 The scenario consisted a negotiation between the participant and an imaginary 
neighbor. The participant was interested in selling a video projector and therefore the 
participant posted an ad in the hallway of the apartment building. The video projector of 
the participant was in good condition, besides of a scratch on the top because it felt once. 
A neighbor was interested in buying the video projector, and the relationship with this 
neighbor was limited to polite greetings in the hallway. In the social reward condition the 
neighbor brought a gift and in the no social reward condition the neighbor brought no 
gift. Then, the participant and the neighbor negotiated about the value of the video 
projector. The video projector was bought for 2000 euro and the preferred selling price 
was between 800 and 2200 euro.
2
  
Reaction to scenario 
                                                 
2
 See appendix for the full version of the scenario.  
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 Negotiation offers. Negotiation offers were assessed by asking three open 
questions about the offers and participants will respond by giving their prices. The first 
question was regarding target price of the offer, namely 'What is your target or goal? 
What is the best price you hope to get the buyer to pay?' The second question was 
regarding height of first offer, namely 'What is your opening price for the video 
projector'’. The third question was regarding limit of offer, namely 'What is the lowest 
price you are willing to accept from the buyer to sell the video projector?'. 
 Negotiation strategy. Negotiation strategy about Questions and Answers were 
assessed with eight statements (Gunia et al., 2011). For example, 'In this negotiation I 
would ask the other party what his/her needs were' (α = .74). Negotiation strategy about 
Substantiations and Offers were assessed with eight statements (Gunia et al., 2011). For 
example, ' I would make a lot of offers' (α = .67). Responses were measured with 7-point 
scales (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree), where higher scores indicated more use of 
the negotiation strategy.  
 Situational trust. Situational trust during the negotiation were assessed with four 
statements (Gunia., 2011). For example, 'In this negotiation I would trust my 
counterparts'. Responses were measured with a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = 
totally agree), where higher scores indicated more trust of the counterpart (α = .81).  
 Positive reciprocity. The positive reciprocity questionnaire was specially 
developed for the present research and it consisted four questions to measure positive 
reciprocity. For example, ' I would feel obliged to accommodate my neighbor'. Responses 
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were measured Responses were measured on a 7-point rating scale (1 = totally disagree, 
7 = totally agree), where higher score indicated more positive reciprocity (α = .76).3 
  Manipulation check. The manipulation will be checked by asking two questions, 
namely 'Did you receive anything from your neighbor?' and 'Did your neighbor bring you 
a gift?', which will be respond with yes or no.  
Results 
Checks  
 Dignity values. To check if dignity-culture participants scored higher on dignity 
values than honor-culture participants, an One- way ANOVA was conducted with the 
independent variable Culture and dependent variable Dignity values. Results showed that 
the main effect of Culture was significant (F(1,204) = 17.73, p < .001, η2p = .08). Thus, 
honor-culture participants and dignity-culture participants differ in the endorsement of 
dignity values. In line with the assumption, Dutch participants scored higher on dignity 
values (M = 5.14, SD = .08) than Spanish participants (M = 4.66, SD = .08).  
 Honor values. To check if honor-culture participants scored higher on honor 
values than dignity-culture participants, an One-way ANOVA was conducted with the 
independent variable Culture and dependent variable Honor values (family). Results 
showed a significant main effect of Culture (F(1,204) = 33.26, p < .001, η2p = .14). Thus, 
honor-culture participants and dignity-culture participants differ in the endorsement of 
honor values (family). In line with the assumption, Spanish participants scored higher on 
honor values (M = 5.58, SD = .11) than Dutch participants (M = 4.74, SD = .10).  
 Moreover, an One-way ANOVA was conducted with the independent variable 
Culture and dependent variable Honor values. Results showed that the main effect of 
                                                 
3
 See appendix for the full version of the positive reciprocity questionnaire. 
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Culture was significant (F(1,204) = 18.60, p < .001, η2p = .08). Thus, honor-culture 
participants and dignity-culture participants differ in the endorsement of honor values 
(personal and family). In line with the assumption, Spanish participants scored higher on 
honor values (M = 5.51, SD = .07) than Dutch participants (M = 5.09, SD = .07). 
 Concluding, these findings corroborate the assumption that Spanish participants 
belonged to an honor culture and Dutch participants belonged to a dignity culture.  
 Self-esteem. To examine individual differences regarding self-esteem between 
the participants of a dignity and honor culture, an One-way ANOVA was conducted with 
the independent variable Culture and dependent variable Self-esteem. Results showed 
that the main effect of Culture was significant (F(1,204) = 19.42, p < .001 η2p = .09), and 
thus the two cultures significantly differ in self-esteem. Dutch participants scored higher 
on self-esteem (M = 4.61, SD = .03) than Spanish participants (M = 4.41, SD = .03). To 
take individual differences in self-esteem into account, ANCOVA's were performed with 
the covariate Self-esteem for each of the hypotheses. ANCOVA was only necessary by 
hypothesis 1, because self-esteem was a significant predictor. However, the results of the 
ANCOVA was slightly different from an ANOVA without the predictor Self-esteem, and 
therefore an ANOVA was performed to test hypothesis 1. 
General and situational trust: hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b 
 To test hypothesis 1 regarding the effect of culture on general trust, an  ANOVA 
was conducted with the independent variable Culture and dependent variable General 
trust. Results showed that the main effect of Culture was significant (F(1,204) = 64.44, p 
< .001, η2p = .20), and the two cultures differ in level of general trust. In line with 
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hypothesis 1, Dutch participants scored higher on general trust (M = 4.96, SD = .08) than 
Spanish participants (M = 4.00, SD = .09).   
Furthermore, to assess hypothesis 2a regarding the main effect of social reward on 
situational trust and hypothesis 2b regarding the interaction effect of culture and social 
reward on situational trust, a Two-way ANOVA was conducted with the independent 
variables Social reward condition and Culture, and dependent variable Situational trust. 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of the Social reward condition 
on situational trust (F < 1, ns), which did not confirm hypotheses 2a. Moreover, the 
results showed that the interaction effect of Culture and Social reward condition was also 
not significant (F < 1, ns). This result did not confirm hypothesis 2b.  
Negotiation offers: hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c 
Furthermore, negotiation offers were measured with three questions. To test 
hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, regarding the main effects of culture and social reward on 
negotiation offers and the interaction effect between culture and social reward on 
negotiation offers, Two-way ANOVA's were performed with the independent variables 
Culture and Social reward condition for each question.  
First, the analysis of the dependent variable 'What is your target' showed that 
there was a significant main effect of Culture (F(1,200) = 23.75, p < .001, η2p = .11). 
Thus, the  honor-culture participants and the dignity-culture participants significantly 
differ in the height of target prices. In line with hypothesis 3a, Spanish participants had 
higher target prices (M = 1739.94, SD = 34.31) than Dutch participants (M = 1516.35, SD 
= 30.46). Also, the main effect of Social reward condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), 
which confirmed hypothesis 3b for this question. Furthermore, the interaction effect of 
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Culture and Social reward condition was not significant (F < 1, ns). This result did not 
confirm hypothesis 3c for this question.  
Subsequently, the analysis of the dependent variable 'What is your opening price 
for the video projector' showed that there was a significant main effect of Culture 
(F(1,200) = 23.59, p < .001, η2p = .11). Thus, the  honor-culture participants and the 
dignity-culture participants significantly differ in the height of openings prices. In line 
with hypothesis 3a, Spanish participants had higher openings prices (M = 1846.24, SD = 
33.13) than Dutch participants (M = 1631.07, SD = 29.41). Also, the main effect of Social 
reward condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), which confirmed hypothesis 3b for this 
question. The interaction effect between Culture and Social reward condition was also 
not significant (F < 1, ns). which did not confirm hypothesis 3c for this question.  
Finally, the analysis of the dependent variable 'What is the lowest price you are 
willing to accept from the buyer to sell the video projector?' showed a significant main 
effect of Culture (F(1,201) = 5.24, p = .023, η2p = .03) and a significant main effect of 
Social reward condition (F(1,201) = 4.91, p = .028, η2p = .02). Thus, the two cultures 
differ in the limit if offer and the presence of a gift influenced the limit of offer as well. In 
line with hypothesis 3a, Dutch participants accepted a lower price from the buyer (M = 
1202.36, SD = 28.71) than Spanish participants (M = 1300.98, SD = 32.15). In contrast to 
hypothesis 3b, participants in the social reward condition were willing to accept a lower 
offer form the buyer (M = 1203.94, SD = 30.32) than participants in the no social reward 
condition (M = 1299.39, SD = 30.64). The interaction effect of Culture and Social reward 
condition was not significant (F(1,201) = 2.20, p = .139), which did not confirm 
hypothesis 3c for this question.  
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Negotiation strategy: hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b and 5c  
  Moreover, to assess the hypothesis 4a, 4b and 4c regarding the main effects and 
interaction effect of culture and social reward on Q&A strategy, a Two-Way ANOVA 
was conducted with the independent variables Culture and Social reward condition, and 
dependent variable Q&A strategy. Results showed a significant main effect of Culture 
(F(1, 201) = 13.27, p < .001, η2p = .06), so the two cultures significant differ in the use of 
the Q&A strategy. In contrast to hypothesis 4a, Dutch participants used the Q&A strategy 
less (M = 4.66, SD = .07) than Spanish participants (M = 5.05, SD = .08). Furthermore, 
the main effect of Social reward condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), which 
confirmed hypothesis 4b. Also, the interaction effect between Culture and Social reward 
condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), which did not confirm hypothesis 4c.  
Also, to test hypothesis 5a, 5b and 5c regarding the main effects and interaction 
effect of culture and social reward on S&O strategy, an One-way ANOVA was 
conducted with the independent variables Culture and Social reward condition, and 
dependent variable S&O strategy. Results showed a significant main effect of Culture 
(F(1, 202) = 14.12, p < .001, η2p = .07). So, the two cultures significant differ in the use 
of the S&O strategy. In line with hypothesis 5a, Dutch participants used the S&O strategy 
less (M = 3.94, SD = .06) than Spanish participants (M = 4.30, SD = .07). Furthermore, 
the main effect of Social reward condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), which 
confirmed hypothesis 5b. Also, the interaction effect between Culture and Social reward 
condition was not significant (F < 1, ns), which confirmed hypothesis 5c.  
 Manipulation check. To assess the validity of the social reward manipulation, a 
Chi square test was conducted with the independent variable Social reward condition and 
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dependent variable 'Did you receive anything from your neighbor?'. Results showed Chi 
square was significant (χ2 (1) = 7.51, p = .006). Thus, the two conditions differ in 
confirming of receiving anything. 86 (83.5%) participants in the social reward condition 
confirmed that they received something from their neighbor compared to 69 (67.0%) in 
the no social reward condition. However, the differences in percentages between the two 
conditions were not that much convincing, what could be explained by the fact that the 
question was unclear stated ('something' receiving from your neighbor can be interpreted 
in multiple ways).  
 Furthermore, a Chi square test was conducted with the independent variable 
Social reward condition and dependent variable 'Did your neighbor bring you a gift?'. 
Results showed Chi square was significant (χ2 (1) = 76.73, p < .001). Thus, the two 
conditions differ in confirming of receiving a gift. 74 (71.8%) participants in the social 
reward condition confirmed that they received a gift from their neighbor compared to 12 
(11.7%) in the no social reward condition. Differences in percentage between the two 
conditions were convincing, what indicated that this question was effective to check the 
manipulation.  
 As intended, participants confirmed that they receive a gift or something when the 
neighbor brings a gift in the social reward condition. This indicates that the manipulation 
of the independent variable social reward was effective.  
Mediation analysis 
 In contrast to the prediction, an effect of social reward condition on 'limit of 
offers' has been found. Participants in the social reward condition were more willing to 
accept a lower price from the buyer than participants in the no social reward condition, 
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what probably could be explained by positive reciprocity. The gift will be reciprocate 
with accepting a lower price. To analyze this prediction, a Two-way ANOVA was 
conducted with independent variables Social reward condition and Culture, dependent 
variable Positive reciprocity. Results showed that a main effect of Social reward 
condition was significant (F(1,202) = 11.56, p = .001, η2p = .06). Participants in the social 
reward condition scored higher on positive reciprocity (M = 3.92, SD = .10) than 
participants in the no social reward condition (M = 3.43, SD = .10). Also, the main effect 
of Culture was significant (F(1,202) = 49.01, p < .001, η2p = .20). Dutch participants 
scored higher on positive reciprocity (M = 4.17, SD = .09) than Spanish participants (M = 
3.18, SD = .11). The interaction effect between Social reward condition and Culture was 
not significant (F < 1, ns). Because this interaction was not significant, only the variables 
Social reward condition, Limit of offer and Positive reciprocity were included in the 
mediation analysis.  
 So, in the mediation analysis, regression was performed with dependent variable 
Limit of offer, independent variable Social reward condition and mediator Positive 
reciprocity. Results showed that Social reward condition influenced Positive reciprocity 
(B = -.46, t (205) = -2.95, p = .004). The variable Social reward condition was 
dichotomous and the social reward condition was coded with 1 and the no social reward 
condition was coded with 2. Thus, the negative regression coefficient indicated that  
positive reciprocity was lower in the no social reward condition than in the social reward 
condition. Also, Positive reciprocity influenced the Limit of offer (B = -40.32, t (205) = -
2.09, p = .0382). Thus, the higher positive reciprocity the lower the limit of offer. 
Furthermore, the relation of Social reward condition on Limit of offer was significant (B 
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= 85.81, t (205) = 1.98, p = .0492). Thus, the positive regression coefficient indicated that  
the limit of the offers was higher in the no social reward condition than in the social 
reward condition. If the mediator Positive reciprocity was excluded, the relation of Social 
reward condition on Limit of offer was not significant (B = 67.21, t (205) = 1.53, p = 
.1276). The regression model was also significant (F(2,202) = 4.17, p = .0169). These 
findings indicates that the effect of Social reward condition on Limit of offer was 
mediated by Positive reciprocity. 4% of the variance in Limit of offer can be explained by 
this mediation model (R
2
 = .04). This indirect effect was different from zero (CI 95% 
between 2.22 and 48.56).  
Discussion 
 This research aimed to investigate the effect of a social reward on trust, 
negotiation offers and negotiation strategy in a negotiation between members of dignity 
and honor cultures. We expected that the presence of a social reward will lead to more 
situational trust, lower negotiation offers (i.e. target goals, first prices and limit of the 
offers) and more use of the Q&A strategy by members of honor cultures. The presence of 
a social reward will not influence situational trust, negotiation offers and use of  
negotiation strategy by members of dignity cultures, because they will generally trust 
others more than members of honor cultures. They will have lower negotiation offers, 
will use less frequently the S&O strategy and will use more often the Q&A strategy than 
members of honor cultures. A negotiation scenario was used to test the hypotheses. The 
analysis showed that members of dignity cultures trust generally more than members of 
honor cultures. Furthermore, members of honor cultures had higher negotiation offers 
and use more the S&O strategy than members of dignity cultures. Surprisingly, members 
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of honor cultures use also more the Q&A strategy compared to members of dignity 
cultures.  
 Regarding the assumptions about trust, only the assumption that members of 
dignity cultures in general trust more than members of honor cultures was supported. The 
loose character of a dignity culture allows members of dignity cultures to trust until is 
proven otherwise (Weber et al., 2005), whereas the tight character of a honor culture 
makes the level of trust of members of honor cultures dependent of the situation and 
benevolence (Branzei et al., 2007). In contrast to the assumptions, social reward did not 
had an effect on situational trust and therefore a social reward did not influence the level 
of situational trust of members of honor cultures in a negotiation. Lack of support of the 
assumptions could not be the result of the manipulation, because the manipulation check 
showed that participants were aware of the gift in the social reward condition. The main 
explanation for absence of an effect of social reward on situational trust is the fact that 
the scenario was not an effective method to measure situational trust. The assumptions 
were based on the results of research which used an interaction between participants 
(Tjosvold, 1985; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; Servátka et al., 2011) It is likely that an 
interaction between participants creates a situation where situational trust plays a salient 
role, because there is more occasion to build situational trust and reciprocate situational 
trust with cooperative behavior.  
 Besides, there were few small details of the negotiation scenario which made it 
difficult to measure situational trust. First, in the scenario situational trust could be less 
important, because the participant was familiar with the buyer instead of a stranger. 
Secondly, the scenario used only a social reward to stimulate cooperation, whereas 
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research showed that the presence of a reward in combination with the threat of a 
punishment was more effective for cooperation than only the presence of a reward 
(Andreoni, Harbaugh, Vesterlund, 2003). To provide participants information that they 
needed money and the buyer was the only opportunity to sell the video projector, results 
in a scenario with a social reward and threat for punishment in case the video projector 
was not sold. In this way, participants will be also more internally motivated to trust the 
buyer, what makes trust in the negotiation more important. The social reward forms an 
external motivation to trust the buyer, what could undermine trusting the buyer (Irwin, 
Mulder, Simpson, 2014).  
 Furthermore, regarding the assumptions about negotiation offers, findings showed 
that the assumption that members of honor cultures had higher negotiation offers than 
members of dignity cultures was supported. Members of honor cultures had higher target 
goals, higher first prices of the offers and higher limits of the offers, what could be the 
result of more use of a competitive strategy and higher aspirations of members of honor 
cultures in negotiations. It could also be the result of the lower level of general trust and a 
high level of betrayal aversion of members of honor cultures: they dislike the uncertainty 
or social risks which are involved by trusting another person (Bohnet, Greig, Hermann & 
Zeckhauser, 2008). Therefore, they probably demanded high negotiation offers in case 
their trust will be betrayed.  
 Moreover, in line with the assumption, target goals and first prices were not 
affected by the presence of a social reward. Previous research showed that target goals 
and first prices of offers are the result of the motives and aspirations of the negotiator 
(Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). However, in contrast to the 
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assumption the presence of a social reward did influence the limit from offers. The 
presence of a social reward made participants more willing to accept a lower offer from 
the buyer. The mediation analysis showed that this effect could be explained by positive 
reciprocity: the gift was reciprocated with accepting a lower price. Furthermore, in 
contrast with the assumption, the presence of a social reward did not lower the 
negotiation offers of honor-culture members as a result of reciprocity norms. Lack of 
support of this prediction has been shown in the mediation analysis, which showed no 
interaction between social reward and culture on reciprocity. This could be explained by 
the fact that the scenario does not measure an effect of social reward on situational trust. 
In the scenario situational trust in a negotiation seems not be important and there was no 
need to reciprocate situational trust with cooperative behavior by lowering negotiation 
offers.  
Surprisingly and in contrast to the assumption, we found that members of honor 
cultures used more the Q&A strategy than members of dignity cultures. Also, in contrast 
to the predictions, the presence of a social reward did not lead to more situational trust 
and use of Q&A strategy for members of honor cultures. An explanation is that the 
scenario was not effective for measuring situational trust, thus the use of the Q&A 
strategy was not dependent on the level of situational trust of the participants. If trust 
does not play a role, the Q&A strategy became a low risk method for members of honor 
cultures and an effective strategy to share information in order to achieve the high 
negotiation offers. In the absence of trust, negotiators could use low risk methods like 
directional information sharing about preferences and priorities or competitive behaviour 
to achieve their aspirations (Kimmel et al., 1980).  
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 Furthermore, the assumption that members of honor cultures use more the S&O 
strategy than members of dignity cultures was supported. Members of honor cultures 
were less likely to trust the counterpart and the S&O strategy was not based on trust 
(Gunia et al., 2011). Besides, the S&O strategy can be the result of competitive motives, 
what characterized members of honor cultures in negotiations (Aslani et al., 2011). 
Moreover, as expected the presence of a social reward did not influence the use of S&O 
strategy, for both members of dignity and honor cultures. Situational trust seems not to 
play a role in the scenario, but the S&O strategy relies not on trust and the use of the 
S&O strategy was likely to be independent of the presence of a social reward.  
There are some limitations of the present study. First, the present study used a 
scenario instead of an interaction between participants, what made it difficult to measure 
situational trust. In a interaction situational trust is more important, because there is more 
occasion to build situational trust and reciprocate situational trust with cooperation than 
in a scenario. Therefore, we assume that an interaction will give different results and 
future research could investigate the effect of social rewards on situational trust of 
members of honor and dignity cultures in an actual interaction. However, the interaction 
should take place in a laboratory or virtual setting in order to draw conclusion about 
causality. Secondly, there were small details of the scenario which made it difficult to 
measure situational trust. For example, the absence of punishment-reward situation to 
stimulate cooperation and the absence of internal motivation to trust the buyer. Also, the 
topic of the scenario was to negotiate with your familiar neighbor instead of a stranger, 
what made situational trust less important. These factors should be taken into account in 
order to measure situational trust in future research in a scenario as well in an interaction. 
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Finally, because the findings of the present research were based on a scenario the external 
validity is limited. Findings based on interactions between participants, were more 
applicable for situations in the real world. However, the aim of the present research was 
first to find effects of rewards on situational trust, negotiation offers and strategies and 
future research could make conclusions based on interactions between participants of 
honor and dignity cultures in laboratory or field settings to generalize the results.  
Our findings contributed to the research of cultural differences in use of 
negotiation strategies and offers. However, it is still unknown how rewards and 
situational trust affect the negotiations processes of members of dignity and honor 
cultures and future research should further analyze this relationship in an interaction. In 
an interaction situational trust is an important factor, which influence use of negotiation 
strategy, information sharing and negotiation outcomes of members of dignity and honor 
cultures. It will lead to additional results and further insights to what we found, and more 
applicable for situations in the real world. Future research to this topic will be of value, 
because to increase trust and cooperation between members of dignity and honor cultures 
is important for the more and more internationalization of the societies. 
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Appendix 
Scenario 
You are interested in selling a video projector. For that purpose, a few days ago, 
you posted the following ad in the hallway of your apartment building: 
FOR SALE: I am selling my video projector. I bought it for 2 000€ six-months 
ago and it is still under warranty for another 18 months. It is in perfect condition, except a 
scratch on the top that does not impact performance. Price is negotiable. 
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You hope some of your neighbors are interested in buying it from you. You 
bought this high quality projector six months ago to use it at home for watching movies 
and pictures but you stopped using it very quickly. When you were trying to install it, you 
realized that the connection was not simple and the projector almost fell down, as a result 
of this incident, it is scratched on the top. But it works very well. You know that 
nowadays more and more people have projectors at home and you expect your neighbors 
to be attracted by it. The use of this projector can’t only be home but also for business in 
a more professional environment. 
Until now, relationships among neighbors were limited to polite greetings in the 
hallway. Luckily, one of your neighbors is at the door with a gift for you in one hand 
and asking about the video projector. You welcome your neighbor into your living room, 
where you have placed the projector in its package, ready to go. 
You both sit down, and you start thinking about the value of the video projectors. 
You know that the video projector you bought was 2.000 € and it is still under warranty. 
You estimate the value of a similar product at around 800-2.200€. 
 
Positive reciprocity questionnaire  
In this negotiation… 
I would feel obliged to accommodate my neighbor  
I would have to reciprocate my neighbor’s gesture 
I would feel like I have to repay a favor 
I would bring my neighbor a gift in the future 
 
